It's dangerous. Rising coffee! Does Luckin Coffee, who plays the old routine of Internet marketing, really have a way out?

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Huang Taiji, Master Xi, Xi Tea. In recent years, domestic online celebrity catering brands have emerged one after another and blossomed everywhere. But from the point of view of their development, the author can not escape the old routine of the evolution of Internet brands. And now most of these so-called online celebrity catering brands are not very good, which can be said to be full of sorrow. Now, in this online celebrity catering matrix, there is more "Luckin Coffee".

Luckin Coffee, now only four months old, threw out a series of seemingly dazzling figures at a press conference in May: opening 13 cities, 400 stores, 1.3 million customers and 5 million cups of coffee. In terms of its development trajectory, it is similar to many new things before, such as hot O2O, shared bicycles and so on. With the support of capital, Luckin Coffee's momentum can be maintained, but if the core problem can not be solved, then the more prosperous now, the more serious the decline in the future. Therefore, we still have these questions about Luckin Coffee.

Coffee ≠ Chinese rigid demand, lucky may be difficult to lead the trend

The reason why Luckin Coffee entered the bureau with ambition is that he believes that there is still great potential in the domestic coffee market. Perhaps in the case of Luckin Coffee, it is going to play a role in leading the trend of coffee consumption, making coffee consumption a rigid demand of the Chinese people. But is this really the case?

According to the 2017 China Beverage Store Development report, the number of milk tea shops experienced a rapid rise in 2016, while coffee shops were declining. In June 2017, compared with January 2016, the number of milk tea shops increased by 60%, while the number of coffee shops decreased by 21%. The sharp decline in stores also proves that coffee is not popular with most people in China.

And at present, Chinese mainland consumes 5-6 cups of coffee per person, compared with 20 cups in first-tier cities. Compared with the United States, which consumes 400 cups of coffee per capita per year, and South Korea, which consumes 200 cups of coffee, it is clear that coffee consumption in China has not yet formed a climate. In other words, most Chinese people are not in the habit of drinking coffee.

On the other hand, coffee is also more expensive. For example, many people regard going to Starbucks for coffee as a very stylish event, reflecting the unapproachability of coffee consumption. According to the data, the per capita annual income of the United States in 2016 was 59039 US dollars. In the United States, the price of a cup of Starbucks is $2.73, and the annual consumption of coffee is more than $900.

But in China, take Beijing, which has a higher average income, as an example, the per capita annual income in Beijing in 2016 was 119928 yuan. The price of a cup of Starbucks is 24 yuan, assuming that it costs 8760 yuan to drink Starbucks every day. The price of Luckin Coffee's cup of American coffee shop is 21 yuan, which is more than 7000 yuan a year. Let coffee consumption account for nearly 10% of income? I am afraid that the vast majority of Chinese people do not have that kind of "trench air".

Generally speaking, coffee is not a rigid demand of the Chinese people. Chinese people neither have the habit of drinking coffee every day, nor will they spend so much on coffee. Luckin Coffee's vision is to "make good coffee that everyone can afford and drink", but when the price is not close to the people, it is too difficult to "afford it". Luckin Coffee's imagination of the future development prospect is beautiful, but it does not seem to be so approachable.

Under the new retail coat, lucky may be difficult to guarantee the quality of coffee.

Luckin Coffee obviously has a great insight into the current business trend and has adopted the so-called new retail model. When outsiders questioned that Luckin Coffee was only a variant of "take-out coffee", the latter said that the company was positioned as a "new retail professional coffee operator", adopting the strategy of self-pick-up + delivery, online and offline.

In fact, Luckin Coffee's approach is to deprive the coffee of the "social load". Let the original Starbucks-based in-store consumption scene, transferred to the "infinite scene", and then become a kind of daily consumption. Regardless of whether consumers will accept the stripped mood and forced scene of coffee, it may be difficult to guarantee the quality in other scenes such as coffee takeout.

You know, the taste of coffee has been changing since it was made, and if you don't drink it for a few minutes or more than ten minutes, it may become hard to swallow. Can Luckin Coffee solve such a problem? It is still open to question. And Luckin Coffee such a rapid expansion rate, how to ensure that the quality of every cup of coffee is consistent?

Lucky focuses on high-quality coffee and invites the champion team of the World baristas Competition to mix the flavors. But it is obviously impossible for such a master to be equipped in hundreds of stores, and it still needs the baristas in each store to make it by hand. How to ensure that the level of coffee is at a high standard? How to compete with lower-priced competitors? These are all the problems that Luckin Coffee wants to solve.

In fact, the so-called new retail is not a "one-size-fits-all" truth, if there is no matching ability, the new retail model is just a good-looking "coat". Under the coat, the taste, the most important essence of coffee, may be ignored. If Luckin Coffee can not grasp the taste and quality of coffee, then how many stores will not help.

Attaching importance to assets: Luckin Coffee's weakness

From another point of view, with the support of capital, Ruixing has been able to set up more than 500 stores. The 500 stores are divided into four categories: ELITE flagship store, RELAX leisurely store, PICKUP express store, KITCHEN takeout kitchen store. There is no doubt that Luckin Coffee wants to firmly hold the control in his own hands, so he does not adopt the mode of franchise store.

But as a result, Luckin Coffee takes heavy assets as the main mode of operation. Like the bike-sharing industry before, each company has to purchase a large number of bicycles to put in, and then equipped with a large number of manpower to operate. If Luckin Coffee wants to get a lot of revenue from the high flow of people, the store must be in the core of the business circle, and the last time it must be near the business circle. Store rent, decoration expenses, late water and electricity fees, manager / barista / waiter salary, raw material procurement, advertising and marketing expenses are all cost inputs that can not be ignored.

1 billion is really stretched for 500 stores. Even if it can be opened, there will be more expenditure in the future. Coupled with the fact that the coffee habit of the Chinese people has not yet been really cultivated, the early revenue will not be satisfactory. Under the heavy asset model, without successive financing, Luckin Coffee's capital chain is likely to break-just like those failed bike-sharing companies. In this way, heavy assets have become Luckin Coffee's weakness.

Lucky is still playing the old tricks of Internet marketing.

Luckin Coffee's current popularity is directly related to its turning to the old routines of Internet marketing. Celebrity endorsements, outdoor advertisements, registration, recommendation and delivery. Obviously, Luckin Coffee is using mobike, Didi, Meituan and other "old-timers" to try to quickly make a name for themselves and open up the coffee consumption market.

Just recently, Luckin Coffee played porcelain touch marketing again. In an open letter to Starbucks, it said it would sue Starbucks' monopolistic practices in several cities across the country because of the exclusive terms of its contracts with properties and the fact that Starbucks required suppliers to stand in line.

Luckin Coffee is naturally in a weak position in the face of Starbucks and can only be regarded as a "rising star". For this reason, it does not hesitate to rely on Starbucks for warmth-just as domestic phones always like to show themselves with Apple's iPhone when they are released.

But this kind of porcelain marketing is actually meaningless. In the face of Starbucks, a behemoth that has dominated China and even the global coffee market for many years, Ruixing has no capital to win. Even from another point of view, Luckin Coffee "out of thin air" to criticize Starbucks, but also let their own brand credibility hurt.

I have to say, although Luckin Coffee is well versed in the routines of Internet marketing, it seems to be just a gimmick. If you want to rely on marketing, it is obviously impossible to rise 90,000 miles.

Judging from the current development situation, Luckin Coffee's future survival may be relatively simple. But it is far from easy to grow into a giant in the coffee market. In the face of multiple problems, Luckin Coffee, although he has a momentum of rapid development, is actually supported by existing capital. If a node is broken, it may cause Luckin Coffee to collapse.

Therefore, Luckin Coffee's current high profile also has to be done. After all, in this noisy era, only by "shouting loudly" can we attract attention and create more opportunities. However, if Luckin Coffee does not solve his own problems, he will still be in a critical situation.